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Labor Markets in Transition:
Science and Migration after the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union
Ina Ganguli
In this dissertation, I draw upon the collapse of the Soviet 
Union to shed light on the behavior of workers and the human 
capital they embody. The questions I address in each of the 
three essays have general economic importance and public 
policy implications: What is the impact of grants on occu-
pational choice and productivity? What is the relationship 
between location and productivity? How do incentives in the 
wage structure impact migration decisions? The changes that 
accompanied the end of the USSR, the increased availability 
of microlevel data in recent years in the form of publication 
and census data, and quasi-experimental methods allow me to 
provide new causal evidence on these topics. 
The fi rst two essays concern the behavior of scientists, 
members of the labor force with high levels of human capital 
and who play an important role in knowledge production 
and economic growth. In the fi rst essay, I ask how research 
grants impact scientifi c output and scientists’ decisions in a 
setting with a large scientifi c labor force but limited funding 
opportunities. Using information from the earliest large-scale 
grant program for Soviet scientists, I employ a regression 
discontinuity design to obtain causal estimates of the impact 
of grants. I construct a unique panel data set of scientists 
and their publications and show that the grants more than 
doubled researcher publications and induced scientists to 
remain in the science sector. 
In the second essay, I study the unprecedented exodus 
westward of scientists after the end of the USSR and exam-
ine both the selection of emigrants and the impact of emigra-
tion on their subsequent productivity. Using a unique panel 
data set of Russian scientists and a difference-in-differences 
approach, I show that scientists who emigrated after the end 
of the USSR were more productive after they left Russia 
compared to scientists who did not emigrate. Exploiting the 
increase in international collaboration among scientists who 
did not emigrate, I also show that international collaboration 
is associated with an increase in researcher productivity, but 
less than for emigration. 
In the third essay, I analyze immigrant selection before 
and after the USSR within a Roy Model framework. With 
microlevel data from Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria, along 
with data for immigrants in the United States, Spain, and 
Greece, I compare immigrants’ predicted wages in the source 
country with the predicted wages of their native counter-
parts. I also reweight the source country wage distributions 
by the characteristics of immigrants in host countries. These 
approaches allow me to see what part of the source country 
distribution immigrants would fall in had they not emigrated. 
I fi nd evidence of positive selection for the United States, 
and negative selection for Greece and Spain after the fall 
of the Soviet Union. During communism, selection among 
Soviet men in the United States was intermediate and selec-
tion among women was positive. 
While a shock on the scale of the Soviet collapse is 
unlikely to recur, the evidence I provide about the behav-
ior of workers from the Soviet experience can help inform 
policymakers in the areas of labor, science, and immigration 
policy. As in most crisis situations, the end of the Soviet 
Union was unexpected. Recent experiences regarding the 
magnitude and unexpectedness of the fi nancial crisis and 
natural disasters show the fragility of government resources 
and institutions. The evidence in this dissertation suggests 
that after sharp economic changes, workers make important 
occupation and location decisions. Targeted policies can 
impact the size and productivity of the labor force during 
these times of transition, which can have lasting impacts on 
innovation, economic growth, and well-being. 
Chapter 1
Saving Soviet Science: The Impact of Grants 
When Government R&D Funding Disappears 
Governments fund science in order to support the produc-
tion of basic scientifi c knowledge, a key input for innova-
tion, and ultimately, economic growth (Brooks 1994; Romer 
1990). How can policymakers most effectively support 
scientists in the advancement of scientifi c knowledge? The 
answer to this question is still not well understood, especially 
considering the extent of government resources devoted to 
this pursuit. Existing research has almost exclusively focused 
on developed country settings, where levels of government 
R&D funding are high and fi nancing opportunities abound. 
Therefore, estimates of the impact of any specifi c R&D fund-
ing program are typically underwhelming due to the wide 
availability of alternate funding opportunities (e.g., Jacob 
and Lefgren 2007) or a potentially inelastic supply of scien-
tists (Goolsbee 1998). 
In this essay, I estimate the impact of one type of R&D 
funding—research grants for basic scientists—on scientifi c 
output and scientists’ decisions in a setting with very limited 
public sector funding for science. Drawing upon the earliest 
large-scale “emergency” grant program for Soviet scientists, 
funded by fi nancier George Soros under the auspices of 
the International Science Foundation (ISF), I estimate the 
impact of grants when there is a large scientifi c labor force 
but limited funding opportunities for scientists. This “experi-
ment,” the dramatic drop in government R&D funding, and 
the ISF grant program provide an opportunity to estimate the 
marginal impact of funding for science when there are few 
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funding opportunities and the supply of scientists is presum-
ably very elastic. 
The ISF grant program had two components: an indi-
vidual and a team-based grant. The fi rst component was an 
individual cash grant of $500, which represented approxi-
mately one year’s salary at the time, and was awarded to 
over 26,000 basic scientists actively publishing in top Soviet/
Russian and international journals. The second component 
was aimed at supporting the research team of the top scien-
tists. An additional $1,000 was given to the “best” scientists 
among all those who received the individual cash grant, 
which they were to divide among members of their research 
team. 
There are still few studies providing evidence on the 
causal impact of grants on scientifi c output due to the associ-
ated empirical challenges. Because grant receipt is likely 
to be correlated with ability or other unobserved factors, 
simple estimates of the impact of grant receipt would tend 
to be biased upward due to selection issues (see Jaffe [2002] 
for a discussion). Grants are rarely randomly assigned, and 
instead are usually awarded after extensive review processes, 
the deliberations of which are often confi dential. Apart from 
Jacob and Lefgren (2007), who exploit discontinuities in 
National Institute of Health priority scores and grant receipt, 
few studies have been able to examine grant programs that 
provide conditions in which to avoid selection problems.
In this case, I was able to employ quasi-experimental 
methods to obtain causal estimates of the impact of the 
grants. The ISF grants were called “emergency” grants 
because Soros desired that the funds be dispersed to scien-
tists as quickly as possible considering the dire situation. 
Therefore, simple eligibility criteria had to be used: to 
receive the grant, an individual had to have at least three 
publications between 1988 and the time of the grant program 
announcement in 1993. Moreover, the recipients of the team 
grant would be the scientists who had the highest impact 
factor scores among all those who applied, based on each 
scientist’s top three publications, so no additional application 
process was used. 
The suddenness of the program and the simple, nonlinear 
structure of the eligibility rules allow me to avoid typical 
selection issues and utilize exogenous variation in grant 
receipt. I estimate the causal impact of the grants by com-
paring scientists who just missed the eligibility cutoffs with 
those who just made them using regression discontinuity and 
difference-in-differences approaches. The reasoning is that 
scientists who just missed the cutoffs are a good counter-
factual group for those who just made the cutoff—they are 
likely to be very similar in observable and unobservable 
ways, and only differ in their receipt of the grant.
Theoretical work in this area suggests that differing incen-
tive schemes can play a role in the production of scientifi c 
knowledge, and thus the structure of grants and the incen-
tives they provide likely matter for scientists’ outcomes (e.g., 
Manso 2009). The two types of grants in this case provide 
an opportunity to estimate the impact of funding when it is 
awarded to an individual scientist, and in line with the recent 
evidence on the increasing importance of collaboration and 
teams in scientifi c research, when it is awarded to a scien-
tist’s research team (e.g., Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang 2010; 
Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi 2007).1 
Scientifi c grants can have an impact on both the extensive 
margin (size of the science sector) and the intensive margin 
(output of researchers in the science sector). Both margins 
are likely to be salient in the post-Soviet setting. A key con-
cern during this time was that scientists would exit the sci-
ence sector because salaries had dropped too low and there 
were alternative career options in the private sector. Another 
concern was “brain drain”—that scientists would emigrate to 
western countries, or might be recruited by rogue nations or 
terrorist organizations for their knowledge related to weap-
ons. Thus, in addition to the intensive margin, I examine the 
impact of grants on the extensive margin and on emigration 
rates. 
The expected impact of the grants on these outcomes is 
not clear-cut from a theoretical standpoint. First, it is not 
clear how a one-time pecuniary shock would affect participa-
tion in the science sector or productivity, especially consid-
ering that challenges in enforcement may have essentially 
made the individual grant “no strings-attached.” Second, the 
expected impact on migration rates is ambiguous. The indi-
vidual grant may have decreased migration costs by reducing 
credit constraints, thereby increasing migration probabilities; 
or it may have provided temporary means of subsistence to 
scientists that deterred migration in the short run. I provide 
a conceptual framework in which to think about the pos-
sible impacts the grants may have had on outcomes based on 
models of occupational choice and the migration decision. I 
also consider the role of incentives embedded in the struc-
ture of the two types of grants: the team grant, which would 
be expected to facilitate research but not migration; and the 
individual grant, which could do either. 
To test these hypotheses, I create a panel data set of 
grantees and nongrantees and match them to their publica-
tions and locations using the Thomson Reuters ISI Web of 
Science database.2 My analysis provides evidence that both 
grants had a positive impact on researcher publications. 
The individual cash grant prevented scientists from exiting 
science, particularly in the poorer, non-Moscow areas, and 
doubled researcher publications on the margin. With higher 
wages, more outside career options, and alternative funding 
options in Moscow, this suggests that the individual grant 
had more “bite” outside of Moscow, which is consistent with 
theoretical predictions. The individual grant appears to have 
prevented emigration among scientists, but only in Moscow, 
where the costs of migration were lower. The increase in 
publications attributed to the individual grant suggests that 
Soros and the ISF spent about $100 per publication. The 
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team grant also increased the team leader’s publications on 
the margin, suggesting that there are complementaries in the 
team production of research. The team grant, meanwhile, 
seems to have facilitated migration, likely by sustaining 
researcher productivity in the short run that kept the door 
open for subsequent emigration possibilities.
Chapter 2
Location and Scientifi c Productivity: Evidence 
from the Soviet “Brain Drain” 
Policymakers in both the developed and developing world 
are concerned about the location decisions of the world’s 
scientists and engineers and how these decisions impact their 
productivity. While many scientists and engineers today are 
born or trained in the developing world, few stay there. In 
fact, many of the top, “highly cited” scientists in the world 
were born in developing countries, but very few remain there 
to do their research (Hunter, Oswald, and Charlton 2009; 
Weinberg 2010). Given the important role of scientists in 
knowledge production and economic growth (Romer 1990), 
countries that produce scientists but have their “brains 
drained” are concerned about stemming this outfl ow, while 
countries like the United States are benefi tting from this 
increasing “globalization” of science.3 
While simple comparisons of the research output of 
scientists in the developing and developed world suggest 
large disadvantages to being located in a low-income coun-
try (see Kahn and MacGarvie [2008]), the factors driving 
these differentials are not obvious. It is likely that there are 
observed or unobserved differences between the individu-
als who choose to emigrate and those who do not in terms 
of their preferences or their ability, which may be correlated 
with research productivity. Therefore, without accounting for 
these differences, estimates of the impact of being located 
in a developed country would be biased upward. Recent 
research on the mobility of scientists between countries has 
focused on understanding which scientists emigrate, i.e., the 
measurable selection of scientists, and has made steps toward 
understanding the causal impact of emigrating on the produc-
tivity of the individual and their peers. This evidence sug-
gests that scientists doing research in developing countries 
appear to be at a disadvantage when compared to otherwise 
similar scientists located in developed countries (Kahn and 
MacGarvie 2008). 
The productivity differentials between the developed and 
developing world may be driven by a number of factors, 
which can be considered inputs in the researcher production 
function, such as differences in research funding and infra-
structure, or knowledge inputs that depend on the peer group. 
That is, in addition to more tangible differences, there may 
be barriers to knowledge transfer in developing countries due 
to the geographic distance from other scientists in the fi eld 
(peers), which implies fewer knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993), or from other nonphysi-
cal barriers to accessing knowledge (Agrawal, Kapur, and 
McHale 2008). Other factors tied to a location, such as the 
location of journal editorial boards or the culture surrounding 
publication, can also matter for productivity. 
To address concerns about endogeneity, previous studies 
have attempted to use individual fi xed effects models that 
account for unobserved factors that may be correlated with 
research productivity, or instrumental variables approaches 
that provide exogenous variation in the location decisions 
of scientists. However, the data requirements of these 
approaches are signifi cant. Because of the diffi culty in track-
ing the location of scientists, much of the existing research 
on the mobility and selection of scientists has used samples 
of several hundred scientists who have moved between 
countries, or are comprised of individuals in one fi eld of sci-
ence. The empirical challenge is that it is typically diffi cult to 
observe scientists’ outcomes before and after they make the 
decision to emigrate, and to fi nd comparable control scien-
tists who did not emigrate. 
In this essay, I draw upon the unprecedented exodus west-
ward of highly skilled scientists after the end of the USSR 
to examine both the selection of emigrants and to estimate 
the impact of emigration on their subsequent productivity. 
The USSR was a country that had a large scientifi c commu-
nity but was relatively “closed” to contact with researchers 
outside of the Eastern bloc. When the Soviet Union col-
lapsed, there were almost suddenly opportunities to meet 
western scientists, to travel, and to emigrate. Many scientists 
chose to move abroad to the United States, Israel, or Europe 
to continue their careers, and opportunities for collabora-
tion between former Soviet and western scientists increased 
greatly. Anecdotes about the large “brain drain” abound, or 
the darker allusions to the recruitment of scientists by rogue 
nations for weapon building. 
For my analysis, I create a large unique panel data set of 
over 15,000 Russian scientists across many fi elds of science 
who were publishing in the top Soviet journals just before 
the end of the USSR. I match them to their publications and 
affi liations using the Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Science 
before and after the fall of the USSR. The panel nature of 
the data allows me to observe the productivity of the top 
scientists both during Soviet times and after the Soviet col-
lapse, when there was increased mobility. In terms of selec-
tion, I show that on a number of observable characteristics, 
emigrants look very different from those who stay at home. 
The emigrants tend to be selected from the upper part of the 
productivity distribution, and tend to be younger. 
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I then show 
that scientists who emigrated were more productive after 
they left Russia compared to scientists who did not emigrate. 
However, I fi nd heterogeneity in this effect. All else equal, 
the most productive scientists during the 10 years before 
Diss. booklet 2011.indd   Sec1:7 11/8/2011   3:13:21 PM
8 2011 Dissertation Summaries
the end of the USSR who later emigrated were no more 
productive after leaving Russia. I also fi nd that the effect 
of emigrating is lower if a scientist was from Moscow. For 
robustness, I also use matching methods to compare indi-
viduals who emigrated to those who look similar on their 
observable characteristics but did not emigrate, as well as an 
instrumental variables approach using distance to Moscow as 
an instrument for the decision to emigrate. 
The end of the USSR and the “opening” of its borders 
not only gave scientists greater freedom of mobility, but also 
allowed them greater opportunity to interact with foreign 
scientists. This increase in access to scientifi c communities 
abroad after the end of the USSR refl ects an aspect of the 
globalization of science that continues to be salient. The rela-
tively recent advances in communication through the Internet 
and greater ease of travel are allowing scientists better access 
to knowledge and increased communication/collaboration 
with scientists abroad from distant locations. This “open-
ness” should improve knowledge transfer by increasing non-
geographic proximity to knowledge and thus reducing the 
productivity differentials between scientists in the developed 
and developing world. However, theory and evidence sug-
gest that face-to-face interactions continue to be important 
(see, e.g., Gaspar and Glaeser [1998] for a discussion). 
In addition to examining the selection of emigrants and 
the productivity differential attributed to emigrating, I also 
exploit the increase in international collaboration among 
scientists who did not emigrate after the end of the USSR. 
This allows me to ask how important these phenomena are 
for the productivity of scientists: international collabora-
tion, which increases access to knowledge and resources 
through nongeographic proximity, and emigration, which 
increases geographic proximity. In the spirit of recent 
research on the potential substitutes for geographic prox-
imity (Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale 2008), I ask whether 
we can view international collaboration as a substitute for 
emigration and whether from a policy perspective, it is one 
way to prevent “brain drain” from developing countries. My 
results show that both emigrants and those who internation-
ally collaborated are positively selected in terms of publica-
tions, but emigrants were the “best of the best.” Then, with a 
difference-in-differences estimation approach using indi-
vidual fi xed effects, I show that while both emigration and 
international collaboration are associated with an increase 
in researcher productivity, by emigrating, scientists gain an 
additional 0.23 publications per year on average compared to 
those who stay but internationally collaborate. This differ-
ence can be considered a measure of the impact of location 
on scientifi c productivity minus the benefi ts of gaining 
access to knowledge and resources through nongeographic 
proximity. 
Chapter 3
Immigrant Selection Before 
and After Communism 
The fall of the Soviet Union brought about many changes 
in the formerly communist countries. Almost suddenly, the 
regime changes led to greater mobility and choice in employ-
ment and residence decisions as emigration restrictions were 
lifted, and levels of internal and international migration 
dramatically increased. Another dramatic change that charac-
terized the transition to market economies was an increase in 
wage inequality, which resulted from changes in the structure 
of wages as the labor markets moved away from communist 
wage grid systems, and from changes in the composition of 
the labor force (see, e.g., Brainerd [2000]; Hunt [2002]). In 
this essay, I study how these changes altered incentives to 
emigrate and the subsequent impact on immigrant selection. 
As the European Union (EU) enlarged in recent years, 
there was considerable interest and concern about the con-
sequences of immigration from its neighbors to the East—
the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, South Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. 
For the EU host countries, the concern was mainly about 
what kinds of workers would immigrate and what increased 
immigration would mean for native labor markets. Mean-
while, the concern in the source countries was about what 
kinds of workers would emigrate and what impact an exodus 
of workers westward would have on home labor markets and 
national demographics. 
Much of the literature on these issues to date deals with 
the former aspect of immigration in the EU, that is, the 
impact on natives (e.g., Angrist and Kugler [2003], who 
look at the impact of European labor market institutions on 
the relationship between immigration on native employ-
ment; and Friedberg [2001], who looks at the impact of 
Soviet immigration on native outcomes in Israel). Yet, there 
is still little empirical evidence on immigrant selection and 
the impacts of emigration from Central and Eastern Europe, 
South Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union on 
source country labor markets. Recent research in the U.S.-
Mexico immigration literature is grounded in the Borjas 
(1987) negative selection hypothesis based on the Roy 
Model framework, which suggests that it is the low-skilled 
workers from more unequal countries with higher returns to 
human capital who choose to emigrate to the United States. 
Since much of the concern in EU countries is that precisely 
the low-wage workers will fl ood the EU gates, where wages 
are higher and less dispersed, my motivation for this essay 
was to test the immigrant selection hypotheses for immi-
grants from a selection of postcommunist countries and 
to see how emigration decisions changed after the end of 
communism.4
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The fall of the Soviet Union provides a unique opportu-
nity to test the selection hypotheses among relatively highly 
educated source country populations, as it dramatically, 
almost suddenly, changed the wage structure and dispersion 
of earnings in the formerly communist countries. Following 
the approaches in the recent immigrant selection literature 
(Chiquiar and Hanson 2005; Moraga 2011), in this essay I 
test the immigrant selection hypotheses using microlevel 
data from three host countries (United States, Spain, and 
Greece) and three postcommunist source countries (Rus-
sia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria). I also use retrospective data 
from Ukraine from 1986 and the United States in 1990 to 
see whether the nature of selection has changed since the 
communist period. The choice of host countries and time 
periods is based on differing levels of wage dispersion—the 
United States has greater wage inequality than Europe, and 
the USSR had less wage inequality than the postcommunist 
countries today. This should differentially impact immigrant 
selection and immigration decisions during these periods and 
to these countries. 
To test the hypotheses, I fi rst estimate Mincerian-style 
wage regressions and compare the returns to observable 
characteristics among residents in source countries and 
immigrants in host countries. Based on these results, I 
make predictions concerning the nature of selection. I then 
compare immigrants’ predicted wages in the source country 
with the wages of their native counterparts for both the com-
munist and postcommunist periods. Next, I use the DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) reweighting method to create 
counterfactual densities of the wages that immigrants would 
obtain if they were paid according to the prices of skills in 
the source countries. The difference between the actual and 
counterfactual densities is immigrant selection in terms of 
potential earnings. Despite limitations of small immigrant 
sample sizes, the results suggests that there is positive selec-
tion for immigrants from all three countries in the United 
States, while there is intermediate to negative selection for 
Spain and Greece. However, since these results are likely to 
be biased upward due to undercounting of immigrants and 
the sorting of immigrants on unobserved ability, it is likely 
that there is even greater negative selection for Spain and 
Greece. For the communist period, I fi nd that among Soviet-
born men in the United States, there was intermediate selec-
tion, while among women, there was positive selection. 
Notes
1. However, I cannot compare the relative importance of the two 
grants, because as described in the empirical section of the 
essay, the estimates are local treatment effects based on different 
samples of scientists who are on the margin of receiving each 
grant.
2. Web of Science ® prepared by THOMSON REUTERS ®, Inc. 
(Thomson ®), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA: © Copyright 
THOMSON REUTERS ® 2010. All rights reserved.
3. There is evidence, however, that countries can gain from return 
migration or from greater access to knowledge from abroad 
(Agrawal et al. 2011).
4. For example, the United Kingdom initially announced it would 
prevent all but “a few highly skilled or agricultural workers from 
taking jobs in Britain” from the new accession countries; Spain 
imposed a two-year restriction on Romanians and Bulgarians 
looking to work in the country when the two countries acceded 
in January 2007 (“Join the queue, says Spain” 2006).
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